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Marijuana-related businesses have blossomed into an industry 
with an estimated total market value of $7.2 billion in 2016, with annual 
growth projected at 17%. Industry surveys report that 62% of marijuana-
related businesses have offered equity stakes to investors and 
approximately one-half of marijuana-related businesses planned to 
actively seek investment funding in 2017. 
Along with the investment opportunity comes heightened fraud 
risk, with regulators cautioning investors against investment due to the 
lack of accurate and publicly-available information. Also, despite state-
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level decriminalization, marijuana possession, sale, and distribution 
continues to be a crime under federal law. The criminal nature of the 
marijuana industry can have ripple effects on investors, even if never 
prosecuted.  
This paper explores the risks to investors presented by the similar 
but distinct doctrines of unclean hands and in pari delicto, both of which 
provide that a court should not allow a person engaged in wrongful 
conduct to profit therefrom. Because marijuana-related businesses are 
criminal enterprises, the doctrines may bar investors from pursuing civil 
actions for securities fraud or other misconduct.  
Existing case law does not provide sufficient guidance to courts in 
resolving the potentially competing policies of securities law enforcement 
and controlled substance enforcement. This article therefore proposes a 
two-step analysis for courts that would encourage courts to ascertain 
whether lawmakers have articulated a clear legislative policy preference 
when applying unclean hands and in pari delicto to criminal conduct. If 




Marijuana-related businesses have blossomed into a market worth 
$7.2 billion as of the end of 2016 and projected to grow at an annual 
compound rate of 17%,1 despite the fact that marijuana cultivation, 
possession, and sale continues to be a crime under the federal Controlled 
Substances Act.2 Federal law enforcement has essentially turned a blind 
eye as states have decriminalized and instituted marijuana cultivation, 
processing, and sale regulatory systems. As of 2017, twenty-one states 
have instituted medical-marijuana programs, with another eight states and 
the District of Columbia allowing recreational-marijuana sales in addition 
to medical sales.3 
The phenomenal growth of the marijuana industry represents an 
enticing opportunity for prospective investors and an equally enticing 
 
1 Debra Borchardt, Marijuana Industry Projected to Create More Jobs than Manufacturing 
by 2020, FORBES (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/debraborchardt/2017/ 
02/22/marijuana-industry-projected-to-create-more-jobs-than-manufacturing-by-
2020/#3b2d0a163fa9. 
2 21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 841 (2018). 
3 Brad Finkelstein, Cash Crop; 29 States. 283,000 New Jobs. $50 billion in Annual 
Revenue. What will it take for the Mortgage Industry to Capitalize on this Opportunity?, NAT’L 
MORTGAGE NEWS (Oct. 22, 2017), https://www.pressreader.com/usa/national-
mortgagenews/20171022/ 
281483571607729. 
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opportunity for securities fraud. While federal securities fraud statutes 
typically offer protection to defrauded investors, it is a fundamental 
principle of equity that a court will not provide a safe-haven to a person 
engaged in criminal conduct. Therefore, investors should recognize that 
the criminal nature of marijuana-related businesses—even if criminal 
prosecution is unlikely—represents a major risk to an investor’s right to 
recover for securities fraud committed by the promoters, officers, or other 
persons in control of a marijuana-related business.  
This article will explore the related but distinct defenses of 
unclean hands and in pari delicto, each of which may bar an investor’s 
ability to pursue a civil action against officers and directors of the 
marijuana-related business for fraud or some other breach of duty. Because 
courts are not consistent in applying the defenses,4 investors should be 
cautious with regards to investment in marijuana-related businesses until 
federal law changes to decriminalize marijuana. Existing law should be 
clarified so that investors have a better understanding of when a fraud 
action may be barred. The article concludes that when unclean hands or in 
pari delicto is raised in a securities fraud action in which criminal business 
activities are implicated, courts should bar the action only where 
lawmakers have articulated a clear policy with regards to the criminal 
activities. 
 
I. INVESTMENT IN MARIJUANA-RELATED BUSINESSES: A 
SUMMARY OF REGULATORY CONCERNS AND EXISTING 
SCHOLARSHIP 
 
The growth of the marijuana industry has spurred an increased 
demand for investors’ capital. Globally, equity investment in marijuana-
related businesses topped $1 billion in 2016.5 According to one industry 
survey, within the United States, approximately one-half of operational 
marijuana-related businesses either actively sought or planned to actively 
seek investment funding in 2017.6 Sixty-two percent of operational 
marijuana-related businesses offered equity to investors.7 Investors, on 
average, have taken a 15% equity position in marijuana-related 
businesses.8 
Investors in marijuana have been relatively inexperienced, 
however. Less than one-fourth percent reported having been a marijuana 
 
4 T. Leigh Anenson, Limiting Legal Remedies: An Analysis of Unclean Hands, 99 KY. L.J. 
62, 68–73 (2010). 
5 MARIJUANA BUS. DAILY, MARIJUANA BUSINESS FACTBOOK 2017, 272 (Chris Walsh ed., 
5th ed. 2017). 
6 Id. at 275. 
7 Id. at 280. 
8 Id. at 282. 
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investor for less than one year; more than three-fourths reported having 
fewer than three years of marijuana-related investment experience.9 As 
one industry trade group reported in 2017, “[a]lthough investment activity 
in the cannabis industry is increasing, big investment firms, venture 
capitalists and institutional investors largely remain on the sidelines, wary 
of getting involved in an industry that revolves around a federally illegal 
substance.”10 Nearly half of investors reported learning about marijuana 
investment opportunities online, despite the fact that the marijuana 
industry remains largely a collection of “small, privately run businesses 
for which little reliable data regarding financial fundamentals is 
available.”11 Indeed, investors reported that the baseless financials were 
their primary reason for not investing in a marijuana-related business.12  
Accordingly, the Securities and Exchange Commission13 (“SEC”) 
and Financial Industry Regulatory Authority14 (“FINRA”) have each 
issued investor alerts cautioning investors against investment in 
marijuana-related businesses due to fraud risks. According to the SEC: 
Fraudsters often exploit the latest innovation, technology, product, 
or growth industry – in this case, marijuana–to lure investors with the 
promise of high returns. Also, for marijuana-related companies that are not 
required to report with the SEC, investors may have limited information 
about the company’s management, products, services, and finances. When 
publicly-available information is scarce, fraudsters can more easily spread 
false information about a company, making profits for themselves while 
creating losses for unsuspecting investors.15 
 
FINRA cautions specifically about “pump-and-dump” schemes: 
 
Like many investment scams, pitches to invest in potentially 
fraudulent marijuana-related companies may arrive in a variety 
of ways—faxes, email or text message invitations to webinars, 
infomercials, tweets or blog posts. Regardless of how you first 
hear about them, the offers almost always contain hallmarks of 
"pump and dump" ploys. Specifically, fraudsters lure investors 
with aggressive, optimistic—and potentially false and 
 
9 Id. at 283. 
10 Id. at 272. 
11 Id. at 292. 
12 Id. at 294. 
13 Investor Alert: Marijuana Related Investments, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
(May 16, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-bulletins/ia_marijuana.html. 
14 Marijuana Stock Scams, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/investors/alerts/updated-
marijuana-stock-scams (last updated May 24, 2014). 
15 Investor Alert: Marijuana Related Investments, supra note 13. 
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misleading—statements or information designed to create 
unwarranted demand for shares of a small, thinly traded 
company with little or no history of financial success (the 
pump). Once share prices and volumes reach a peak, the cons 
behind the scam sell off their shares at a profit, leaving investors 
with worthless stock (the dump).16 
 
Since 2014, the SEC suspended the trading of securities or began 
enforcement actions against several marijuana-related businesses over 
concerns about misrepresentations of financial and operational 
information.17 
Despite the growing number of investors and regulatory concerns 
about misleading information, there is very little scholarship addressing 
the rights of investors who are defrauded by promoters or persons in 
control of marijuana-related businesses. Current marijuana legal research 
largely focuses on the tension between federal regulation and state 
legalization efforts.18 Scholarship on the legality of marijuana-related 
businesses tends to focus on the businesses themselves and their right to 
enforce contracts, as well as the ability to assert other rights given the 
illegality of marijuana under federal law.19 Luke Scheuer addressed the 
potential that marijuana contracts are unenforceable illegal contracts,20 as 
well as managers’ ability to fulfill fiduciary duties and the availability of 
limited liability protection.21 Lauren A. Newell examined whether 
Colorado’s Retail Marijuana Amendment implicitly permits a marijuana-
related business to form as a partnership, despite the general rule that a 
partnership may not be formed for an illegal purpose.22  
 
16 Marijuana Stock Scams, supra note 14. 
17 See, e.g., Trading Suspension, Exchange Act Release No. 71,723, 79 Fed. Reg. 15,201 
(March 14, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/suspensions/2014/34-71723.pdf; Trading 
Suspension, Exchange Act Release No. 72,337, 79 Fed. Reg. 33,254 (June 6, 2014), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/suspensions/2014/34-72337.pdf; Securities and Exchange 
Commission v. Fortitude Group, Inc., et al., Civil Action No. 1:16-cv-00050-SPB (W.D. Pa. filed Feb. 
29, 2016); Securities and Exchange Commission v. Strategic Global Investments, Inc., et al., Civil 
Action No. 3:16-cv-00514-H-JLB (S.D. Ca. filed Feb. 29, 2016); Securities and Exchange 
Commission v. Hemp, Inc., et al., No. 2:16-cv-1413 (D. Nev. Filed June 20, 2016); Securities and 
Exchange Commission v. Notis Global, Inc. (f/k/a Medbox, Inc.), et al., Civil Action No. 2:17-cv-
01905 (C.D. Cal. filed March 9, 2017). 
18 See, e.g., Sam Kamin, Legal Cannabis in the U.S.: Not Whether but How?, 50 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 617 (2016). 
19 See, e.g., Steven Mare, He Who Comes into Court Must not Come with Green Hands: 
The Marijuana Industry’s Ongoing Struggle with the Illegality and Unclean Hands Doctrines, 44 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1351 (2016). 
20 Luke Scheuer, Are “Legal” Marijuana Contracts “Illegal”?, 16 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 
31 (2015) [hereinafter Scheuer, “Legal” Marijuana Contracts “Illegal”?]. 
21 Luke Scheuer, The “Legal” Marijuana Industry’s Challenge for Business Entity Law, 6 
WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 511 (2015) [hereinafter Scheuer, Marijuana Industry’s Challenge]. 
22 Lauren A. Newell, Up in Smoke? Unintended Consequences of Retail Marijuana Laws 
for Partnerships, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1343 (2017). 
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These scholarly works identify the unclean hands doctrine as a 
significant hurdle for marijuana-related businesses. Likewise, this article 
will explore the impact of the unclean hands doctrine and the related in 
pari delicto doctrine in the marijuana industry. However, this article 
distinguishes itself from previous research by focusing on the rights of the 
investors when investing in a business that is prohibited by federal law, 
such as a marijuana-related business.  
 
II. DESPITE STATE-LEVEL EFFORTS TO ALLOW MARIJUANA 
SALES, FEDERAL LAW CRIMINALIZES ALL MARIJUANA-
RELATED BUSINESSES 
 
While the focus of this article is on the private securities law 
implications for investors in the marijuana industry, it is first necessary to 
describe the recent—and convoluted—criminal regulation of marijuana. 
The word “legalized” is commonly used to describe marijuana-related 
businesses operating in compliance with state law, but those businesses 
can hardly be said to be in compliance with marijuana regulation as a 
whole.23 Marijuana remains illegal—criminally illegal—in all states as a 
result of federal law.24 
 The Controlled Substances Act,25 codified at 21 U.S.C. § 801, et 
seq., specifies that “any material, compound, mixture, or preparation, 
which contains any quantity of” marijuana or tetrahydrocannabinols 
(“THC”), the psychoactive substance in marijuana,26 is a Schedule I 
controlled substance.27 By deeming marijuana and THC as Schedule I 
controlled substances, Congress determined that the substances (i) have a 
high potential for abuse, (ii) have no currently accepted medical use in the 
United States, and (iii) have no accepted safety for use under medical 
supervision.28 
The Controlled Substances Act likewise deems it unlawful “to 
manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, 
distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance.”29 Penalties for violation 
 
23 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 801. 
24 Federal Marijuana Law, AM. FOR SAFE ACCESS, https://www.safeaccessnow.org/ 
federal_marijuana_law (last visited Oct. 21, 2018). 
25 The Controlled Substance Act, Pub. L. 91-513, Title II, 84 Stat. 1236, 1242–84 (1970). 
26 Drugs of Abuse (2017), U.S. DEP’T OF  JUSTICE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., https:// 
www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2018-06/drug_of_abuse.pdf (last accessed Oct. 22, 2018). 
27 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (2018). But see Hemp Indus. Ass'n v. DEA, 357 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 
2004) (holding that the inclusion of THC in the Controlled Substances Act refers only to synthetic 
THC and not THC naturally occurring in marijuana). 
28 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1) (2018). 
29 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2018). 
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range from a $1,000 fine30 to life in prison,31 depending on the amount of 
marijuana involved, the violator’s intent, and the criminal history of the 
violator.32 In addition, civil penalties up to $10,000 per violation are 
possible.33 
Obviously, no marijuana grower, processor, or retailer—even in 
those states that have authorized marijuana businesses—could openly 
operate if such federal prohibitions were actively enforced. Thus, the 
growth of the “legal” marijuana industry has been facilitated by two 
federal law enforcement-related items: the so-called “Cole Memos,” and 
the “Rohrabacher-Farr” appropriations amendment. 
The Cole Memos have received much of the media attention with 
regards to federal law enforcement’s inaction with regards to marijuana 
laws. On August 29, 2013, then-Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole 
issued a memorandum (the “2013 Cole Memo”) to all United States 
Attorneys offering guidance on the use of resources relating to civil and 
criminal marijuana law enforcement and prosecutions under the 
Controlled Substances Act.34 The 2013 Cole Memo stressed that, although 
Congress had determined that marijuana is a dangerous drug, the Justice 
Department was focusing its marijuana-related law enforcement efforts on 
eight specific priorities: 
1. Preventing the distribution of marijuana to minors; 
2. Preventing the revenue of marijuana sales from funding criminal 
enterprises, gangs, and cartels; 
3. Preventing the distribution or diversion of marijuana from states 
that have decriminalized marijuana to states that have not; 
4. Preventing state-authorized marijuana operations from serving as 
a cover or pretext for other drug trafficking or illegal activities; 
5. Preventing violence and the use of firearms in the cultivation and 
distribution of marijuana; 
6. Preventing driving under the influence of drugs and the 
exacerbation of other adverse public health consequences; 
7. Preventing growth of marijuana on public lands, and attending to 
public safety and environmental concerns related to marijuana 
production on public lands; and 
 
30 A first-time conviction of possession of a controlled substance, without intent to 
distribute, or distribution of a small amount of marijuana for no remuneration, is punishable by a 
minimum fine of $1,000 and up to one year in prison. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(4) (2018); 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) 
(2018). 
31 Possession of 1,000 kilograms or more of a substance containing a detectable amount of 
marijuana, or 1,000 or more marijuana plants, is punishable by not less than ten years and up to life in 
prison. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(vii) (2018). 
32 Id. 
33 21 U.S.C. § 844a (2018). 
34 Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., to all U.S. Att’ys (Aug. 29, 2013) 
(on file with the Department of Justice). 
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8. Preventing marijuana possession or use on federal property.35 
 
According to the 2013 Cole Memo, besides these eight priorities, 
federal law enforcement had traditionally relied upon—and would expect 
to continue to rely upon—state and local law enforcements to address 
marijuana through their own drug laws.36 The 2013 Cole Memo advised 
that so long as a state marijuana regulatory system is robustly designed 
and enforced in accordance with the eight highlighted priorities, federal 
law enforcement should focus its resources on whether an operation 
complies with such state regulations.37 If federal law enforcement is 
concerned about the design and enforcement of the state systems with 
regards to the eight priorities, then the 2013 Cole Memo instructs district 
attorneys to both challenge the state regulatory systems directly and pursue 
actions against individual marijuana violators.38 
In sum, the 2013 Cole Memo advises federal district attorneys to 
allocate resources to the areas identified by the aforementioned eight law 
enforcement priorities, as well as to rely upon local law enforcement for 
other marijuana-related matters.39 If local law enforcement’s actions are 
inconsistent with the eight priorities, then federal law enforcement could 
appropriately direct resources to rectify the situation.40 
On February 14, 2014, Deputy Attorney General Cole issued 
another memorandum (the “2014 Cole Memo”) that offered guidance to 
all United States Attorneys on the 2013 Cole Memo’s delineation of 
federal law enforcement efforts concerning marijuana-related business 
transactions under the Bank Secrecy Act and other financial crime 
statutes.41 The Bank Secrecy Act42 and the regulations developed 
thereunder required most financial institutions to file a report with the 
Treasury Department regarding any “suspicious transaction relevant to a 
possible violation of law or regulation.”43  
The 2014 Cole Memo stressed the importance of the eight federal 
law enforcement priorities outlined in the 2013 Cole Memo, by instructing 
 
35 Id. at 1–2. 
36 Id. at 2. 
37 Id. at 2–3. 
38 Id. at 3. 
39 Id. at 2. 
40 Id. at 2–3. 
41 Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., to all U.S. Att’ys (Feb. 14, 2014) 
(on file with the Department of Justice). 
42 Bank Secrecy Act, Pub. L. 91-508, Title II, 84 Stat. 1236, 1242–84 (1970). 
43 31 C.F.R. § 1020.320 (2018). Note that although § 1020.320 uses the word “bank,” that 
term is defined to include other financial organizations, including savings and loan associations and 
credit unions chartered under the laws of any state or the United States, or any bank organized under 
foreign law. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100. 
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law enforcement agencies to review possible marijuana-related financial 
crimes with the eight priorities in mind.44 In addition, the 2014 Cole Memo 
referred financial institutions to guidance issued by the Department of 
Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”).45 This 
FinCEN guidance is discussed later in this article.46 
Opponents have criticized the Cole Memos for the memos’ lack 
of clarity as to federal law enforcement’s position on state marijuana 
regulatory schemes.47 What is clear, however, is that the Cole Memos were 
not binding law—they merely served as guides to best practices for federal 
law enforcement agencies.48 Nevertheless, marijuana-related businesses, 
their investors, and their state regulators viewed the Cole Memos as a 
roadmap to legal compliance.49  
Thus, the presidential administration change in 2017 caused 
significant concern in the cannabis industry, as a December 2016 industry 
survey had revealed that a federal crackdown would be the primary factor 
to cause investors to cease investing in marijuana-related businesses.50 
Roughly one-third of marijuana investors reported that Donald Trump’s 
election caused them to change their company’s growth plans, while 
another third were still considering revisions to their plans.51  
Indeed, in January 2018, Attorney General Jeff Sessions rescinded 
the Cole Memos’ guidance as unnecessary, for Justice Department policies 
have always required law enforcement to weigh all relevant factors, 
including enforcement priorities, when allocating resources to 
prosecutorial efforts.52 However, the Sessions guidance is no clearer than 
the Cole Memos—there is no directive to law enforcement agencies to take 
any action with regards to marijuana. Thus, the Cole Memos may 
nevertheless serve as loose guidance with regards to law enforcement 
priorities.  
The other significant limitation on federal law enforcement of the 
marijuana industry does have the force of law: the Rohrabacher-Farr 
appropriations amendment. Introduced by a bipartisan group led by Rep. 
 
44 Cole, supra note 41, at 1–2. 
45 Id. at 3. 
46 See infra note 102 and accompanying text. 
47 See, e.g., Kimberly A. Houser, Legalizing Marijuana: State and Federal Issue: What 
Inconsistent Federal Policy Means for Marijuana Business Owners: Washington's I-502 and the 
Federal Controlled Substances Act, 50 GONZ. L. REV. 305, 327 (2014); Scheuer, Marijuana Industry’s 
Challenge, supra note 21, at 524–26. 
48 Id.  
49 Mona Zhang, Marijuana Investors Aren’t Scared by Sessions’ Change in Pot Policy, 
FORBES (Jan. 6, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/monazhang/2018/01/06/marijuana-investors-
arent-scared-by-sessions-change-in-pot-policy/#744afc480fba. 
50 Walsh, supra note 5, at 295. 
51 Id. at 296. 
52 Memorandum from Jefferson B. Sessions, III, Att’y Gen., to all U.S. Att’ys (Jan. 4, 2018) 
(on file with the Department of Justice). 
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Dana Rohrabacher and Rep. Sam Farr,53 Rohrabacher-Farr amended the 
Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act 2015 to prohibit 
the Justice Department from using any appropriated funds to interfere with 
or prevent the implementation of medical marijuana laws in thirty-two 
states plus the District of Columbia.54 
All subsequent appropriations bills included the Rohrabacher-Farr 
amendment.55 The version appearing in the 2018 appropriations bill covers 
forty-six states, two territories, and the District of Columbia: 
 
None of the funds made available under this Act to the 
Department of Justice may be used, with respect to any of the 
States of Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, 
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, 
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, 
New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West 
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming, or with respect to the 
District of Columbia, Guam, or Puerto Rico, to prevent any of 
them from implementing their own laws that authorize the use, 
distribution, possession, or cultivation of medical marijuana.56 
 
The Justice Department’s initial position on Rohrabacher-Farr 
was that the prohibition barred enforcement action only against the states 
(or state officials) directly—that is, it did not prevent prosecution, civil 
enforcement, or asset forfeiture actions against individual violators of 
federal marijuana statutes.57 Instead, the Justice Department continued to 
defer to the eight priorities outlined in the 2013 Cole Memo in determining 
 
53 See 160 Cong. Rec. H4878 (daily ed. May 28, 2014). 
54 Pub. L. 113-235, Title V, § 538; 128 Stat. 2130, 2217 (2014) 
55 See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 542, 129 Stat. 2242, 
2332–33 (2015); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, Pub. L. 115-31, § 537, 131 Stat. 135 (2017); 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Pub. L. 115-141, § 538, 132 Stat. 348 (2018). 
56 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Pub. L. 115-141, § 538, 132 Stat. 348 (2018). 
57 Patty Stemler, Guidance Regarding the Effect of Section 538 of the Consolidated and 
Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2015 on Prosecutions and Civil Enforcement and Forfeiture 
Actions Under the Controlled Substances Act, SCRIBD, https://www.scribd.com/doc/273620932/ 
Depart-of-Justice-S;ays-Medical-Marijuana-Law-Doesn-t-Impact-Prosecutions (last 
visited June 29, 2018). 
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whether to proceed with an enforcement action.58 Courts considering the 
Justice Department’s strict interpretation have generally dismissed it.59  
The Ninth Circuit’s approach in United States v. McIntosh is 
instructive. McIntosh involved ten consolidated interlocutory appeals and 
petitions for writs of mandamus from three district courts.60 In each of the 
cases, the defendants were indicted for alleged marijuana grow operations 
in violation of the Controlled Substances Act.61 However, the defendants’ 
operations were within states covered by Rohrabacher-Farr. Accordingly, 
the defendants sought to enjoin their respective prosecutions on the basis 
of Rohrabacher-Farr’s prohibition against the use of funds by the 
Department of Justice.62  
After dispensing with preliminary issues of jurisdiction and 
standing, the court tackled the statutory text itself. According to the Ninth 
Circuit, the plain meaning of the Rohrabacher-Farr text “prohibits DOJ 
from spending money on actions that prevent the Medical Marijuana 
States’ giving practical effect to their state laws that authorize the use, 
distribution, possession, or cultivation of medical marijuana.”63 The court 
rejected the Justice Department’s interpretation, holding that prosecution 
of private individuals prevents states from giving “practical effect” to their 
respective medical marijuana laws: 
 
DOJ, without taking any legal action against the Medical 
Marijuana States, prevents them from implementing their 
laws that authorize the use, distribution, possession, or 
cultivation of medical marijuana by prosecuting 
individuals for use, distribution, possession, or cultivation 
of medical marijuana that is authorized by such laws. By 
officially permitting certain conduct, state law provides 
for non-prosecution of individuals who engage in such 
conduct. If the federal government prosecutes such 
individuals, it has prevented the state from giving 
practical effect to its law providing for non-prosecution of 




59 See, e.g., United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2016); United States v. 
Samp, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171732 (E. Dist. Mich. Dec. 13, 2016); Alpenglow Botanicals, LLC v. 
United States, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183041 n.1 (Dist. Colo. Dec. 1, 2016). 
60 McIntosh, 833 F.3d at 1168. 
61 Id. at 1169. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 1176. 
64 Id. at 1176–77. 
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However, the McIntosh court was careful not to allow its ruling to 
be interpreted too broadly. The court stressed that only the text of an 
appropriations rider—not the expressions of intent in legislative history—
may be considered in determining the scope of the prohibition against the 
spending.65 Thus, Rohrabacher-Farr does not forbid any federal 
prosecution against persons engaged in the marijuana industry; the 
limitation instead applies only (i) to the use of Justice Department funds, 
(ii) in the specifically identified states, (iii) to the extent that the use of 
funds would prevent the implementation of state laws authorizing the use, 
distribution, possession, or cultivation of medical marijuana.  
Importantly, under McIntosh, the Justice Department may act 
against an individual or business who is not in strict compliance with state 
medical marijuana laws because such a prosecution would not prevent the 
implementation of state medical marijuana laws.66 Accordingly, the Ninth 
Circuit did not dismiss the criminal indictments. Rather, the court held that 
the defendants were entitled to preliminary hearings to determine whether 
their conduct strictly complied with all relevant provisions of the state 
medical marijuana laws.67  
Lastly, the court noted that nothing in Rohrabacher-Farr 
decriminalizes marijuana, even for medical use.68 The issue is that the 
Department of Justice currently cannot spend funds to prosecute medical 
marijuana market participants in the states covered by Rohrabacher-Farr.69 
In a footnote, the court acknowledged that anyone in any state—including 
those covered by Rohrabacher-Farr—who possesses, distributes, or 
manufactures marijuana for medical or recreational purposes commits a 
federal crime.70  
In addition, even though the Justice Department is limited in its 
enforcement abilities, Rohrabacher-Farr’s prohibition does not extend to 
agencies within other departments, and therefore federal intervention is 
not entirely prohibited.71 For example, the Internal Revenue Service, 
which is a part of the Treasury Department, may continue denying 
 
65 Id. at 1178. 
66 Id. at 1178. 
67 Id. at 1179. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id.  
71 See United States v. Tote, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76572 n.1 (E. Dist. Cal. June 12, 2015) 
(“It must also be noted that the arresting agency in this case is the United States Forest Service, an 
agency of the United States Department of Agriculture, not the Department of Justice. Under the 
Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment the Forest Service's actions would not bar them from enforcing federal 
law, but, once the matter was referred to the Department of Justice for actual prosecution in a court, 
their action would be barred under the amendment.”). 
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business expense deductions for marijuana-related businesses due to the 
fact that they engaged in criminal trafficking of controlled substances.72 
Likewise, the United States Border Patrol, under the Department of 
Homeland Security, may ask at border checkpoints whether state law-
compliant medical marijuana users are in possession of marijuana.73  
Thus, while Rohrabacher-Farr offers some protection against 
criminal prosecution (or other enforcement action) by the federal 
government, that protection is limited to persons who are in strict 
compliance with state medical marijuana laws.74 Those courts 
acknowledging the restrictions imposed by Rohrabacher-Farr nevertheless 
recognize that marijuana remains illegal under federal law, and there is no 
legal protection against legal consequences imposed by other federal 
agencies.75 Furthermore, Rohrabacher-Farr offers no protection with 
regards to state recreational marijuana statutes.76  
 
III. SECURITIES FRAUD, INVESTOR RECOVERY RIGHTS, AND 
PARTICULAR CONCERNS FOR THE MARIJUANA INDUSTRY 
 
The technically criminal, but largely unenforced nature of the 
marijuana industry creates complications beyond criminal law, 
implicating a number of corporate and business law issues for entities in 
the industry. As discussed previously, the scholarship thus far has focused 
on the implications for the marijuana-related entities themselves.77 This 
article, however, focuses on the implications for investors in such entities 
by examining what relief such investors should expect under federal 
securities laws given that they are investing in criminal enterprises.  
Thus, having reviewed the criminal nature of marijuana-related 
businesses, this article now turns to an overview of federal securities law 
and the anti-fraud provisions thereunder.78 This article will specifically 
focus on Section 12 of the 1933 Securities Act (the “1933 Act”)79 and 
 
72 See Green Solution Retail, Inc. v. United States, 855 F.3d 1111, 1114 (10th Cir. 2017). 
73 See Marrufo v. United States Border Patrol, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49109 (D.N.M. Apr. 
11, 2016). In fact, the court in Marrufo held that it was not a violation of the Rohrabacher-Farr 
prohibition for the Justice Department to use funds to represent the U.S. Border Patrol in the action 
because such involvement was not the prevention of New Mexico from implementing its medical 
marijuana program. Id. 
74 Id. 
75 See id. 
76 See Green Solution Retail, Inc., 855 F.3d at 1114. 
77 Mare, supra note 1918; Scheuer, “Legal” Marijuana Contracts “Illegal”?, supra note 
20; Scheuer, Marijuana Industry’s Challenge, supra note 21; Newell, supra note 22. 
78 State law may also offer protection to investors, in the event the investment falls outside 
the federal definition of “security” or the fraud falls outside the scope of federal securities laws. See, 
e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 11-51-501; Cal. Corp. Code § 25401; 2 Del. Code § 73-201. However, this 
article’s analysis is on federal law, as it is federal law that criminalizes marijuana nationwide.  
79 Pub.L. 73–22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933). 
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Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “1934 Act”).80 
Unless an exemption applies, an investment in a marijuana-related 
business likely qualifies as a “security” subject to regulation under both 
statutes.81 The United States Supreme Court broadly construed the concept 
of a “security” to include any “investment of money in a common 
enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others,”82 which 
would almost certainly include an investment in a marijuana-related 
business.83 
 The applicability of a particular federal anti-securities fraud 
provision depends on whether the fraud is committed in the context of a 
registration of securities or in the context of a purchase or sale. The 1933 
Act generally requires that issuers register their securities before offering 
the securities to the public.84 Thus, the anti-fraud provisions of Section 12 
of the 1933 Act create a private cause of action against any person who 
offers to sell a security that is unregistered or who offers to sell a security 
and makes a fraudulent statement in connection therewith: 
 
(a) In general. Any person who— 
(1) offers or sells a security in violation of section 77e of 
this title, or 
(2) offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted by 
the provisions of  section 77c of this title, other 
than paragraphs (2) and (14) of subsection (a) of said 
section), by the use of any means or instruments of 
transportation or communication in interstate commerce 
or of the mails, by means of a prospectus or oral 
communication, which includes an untrue statement of a 
material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in 
order to make the statements, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not 
misleading (the  purchaser not knowing of such untruth or 
omission), and who shall not sustain the burden of proof 
that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable 
care could not have known, of such untruth or omission, 
shall be liable, subject to subsection (b), to the person 
purchasing such security from him, who may sue either at 
 
80 Pub.L. 73–291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934). 
81 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2018); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(10) (2018).  
82 SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946). 
83 Walsh, supra note 5, at 275, 280, 282. 
84 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2018). 
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law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to 
recover the consideration paid for such security with 
interest thereon, less the amount of any income received 
thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages 
if he no longer owns the security.85 
 
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, on the other hand, prohibits 
securities fraud in the “purchase or sale” of a security: 
 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, 
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate 
commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any 
national securities exchange . . . [t]o use or employ, in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security 
registered on a national securities exchange or any 
security not so registered, or any securities-based swap 
agreement any manipulative or deceptive device or 
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations 
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or 
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of 
investors.86 
 
The SEC has clarified the concept of securities fraud under the 
1934 Act with the so-called Rule 10b-5: 
 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, 
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate 
commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any 
national securities exchange, 
 
   (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to 
defraud, 
 
   (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or 
to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make 
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances 
under which they were made, not misleading, or 
 
   (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business 
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon 
any person,  
 
85 15 U.S.C. § 77l (2018). 
86 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2018). 




in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.87 
 
The essential difference between Section 12 of the 1933 Act and 
Rule 10b-5 under the 1934 Act is who may be sued: a defrauded investor 
may sue only his seller under Section 12 of the 1933 Act but may sue the 
person making the fraudulent statement under Rule 10b-5, regardless of 
whether that person was involved in a transaction with the defrauded 
investor.88 
While neither the 1934 Act nor Rule 10b-5 create an express 
private cause of action for violations of the federal securities fraud 
prohibition, the United States Supreme Court has declared that a private 
cause of action is implied by the Act.89 Investors have an express private 
cause of action under Section 12 of the 1933 Act.90  
Private actions by investors for securities fraud may take the form 
of either a direct action or a derivative action.91 A direct action is instituted 
by a defrauded investor (usually as a class action) against the defrauding 
entity, due to a personal injury suffered by the investor (or class).92 A 
derivative claim, on the other hand, arises when an equity investor sues a 
wrongdoer for injury suffered by the corporation because the corporation 
refuses to pursue the action.93 The injury suffered by the equity investor 
(reduction in value of shares due to false information) derives from the 
harm suffered by the corporation.94 Most securities fraud claims are 
pursued as direct claims as it is a personal injury suffered by the investor 
that triggers the recovery right, even if the claim also contains elements of 
harm more closely associated with derivative actions.95  
In the marijuana-related business context, FINRA’s warning 
concerning “pump and dump” schemes reflects the securities fraud 
concerns of both Section 12 and Rule 10b-5.96 Information regarding the 
potential investment is provided to investors arrives via the use of 
“instrumentalities of interstate commerce” such as fax, email, or text 
 
87 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018). 
88 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). 
89 Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 (1971). 
90 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a) (2018). The defrauding offeror or seller “shall be liable, subject to 
subsection (b), to the person purchasing such security from him, who may sue either at law or in equity 
in any court of competent jurisdiction . . .” Id.; see also Blue Chip Stamps, supra note 88. 
91 Richard A. Booth, Direct and Derivative Claims in Securities Fraud Litigation, 4 VA. L. 
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messages.97 Aggressive estimates for growth and investment return are 
submitted as the “pump” with little actual business history to support the 
estimates.98  
Additionally, even if the business has a legitimate financial history 
to report to potential investors, issues with accuracy or auditability may 
make the financial statements misleading. At least nine state public 
accounting boards have cautioned accountants about risks and difficulties 
related to providing accounting services to marijuana-related businesses.99 
Criminal conduct by marijuana-related businesses (even those in full 
compliance with state-level regulatory systems) implicates federal anti-
money laundering statutes and imposes additional burdens on financial 
institutions.100 Virtually any transaction between any financial institution 
and any marijuana-related business entity is potentially subject to civil and 
criminal penalty.101  
FinCEN guidance102 provides some relief but places the burden of 
proof on the financial institution to verify that the marijuana-related 
business transactions are in compliance with state law and federal 
prosecutorial policy.103 Because these and other financial regulatory issues 
are governed by Treasury Department regulations, enforcement is not 
limited by Rohrabacher-Farr’s restrictions.104 Furthermore, because the 
FinCEN guidance was issued in concert with and in reliance upon the now-
revoked Cole Memos, it is unclear whether the guidance may still be relied 
upon.105 
As a result of the restrictions on financial institutions, marijuana-
related businesses have difficulty obtaining banking and other financial 
services. Of the more than 11,300 banks and credit unions in the United 
States,106 only 400 (less than 4%) reported that they provided financial 
 
97 Marijuana Stock Scams, supra note 14. 
98 Id. 
99 Providing Services to Businesses in the Marijuana Industry: A Sample of Current 
Board Positions, AICPA (Jan. 2018), 
https://www.aicpa.org/content/dam/aicpa/advocacy/state/downloadabledocuments/marijuana-state-
board-positions.pdf. 
100 See Julie Andersen Hill, Marijuana, Federal Power, and the States: Banks, Marijuana, 
and Federalism, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 598 (2015). 
101 Id. at 610–17. 
102 BSA Expectations Regarding Marijuana-Related Businesses, FINANCIAL 
CRIMES NETWORK ENFORCEMENT (Feb. 14, 2014), 
http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/ 
FIN-2014-G001.pdf. 
103 Hill, supra note 100, at 614–16. 
104 Id. at 607. 
105 Memorandum, supra note 34. 
106 Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 2017 Annual Report 87 (2018) (reporting that there were 5,738 
FDIC-insured institutions as of 2017); Nat'l Credit Union Admin., 2017 Annual Report 183 (2018) 
(reporting that there were 5,573 federally insured credit unions as of 2017). 
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services to marijuana-related businesses as of September 30, 2017.107 
Thus, many marijuana-related businesses are cash-only businesses, and 
cash-only businesses are more difficult to tax and regulate.108 
Additionally, without reliable accounting and assurance systems to verify 
financial results, the fraud concerns raised by the SEC and FINRA are 
compounded.109 
 
IV. UNCLEAN HANDS AND IN PARI DELICTO: DIFFICULTIES IN 
RESOLVING THE DEFENSES DUE TO INCONSISTENCY IN 
APPLICATION AND UNCERTAINTY IN FEDERAL POLICY 
 
To be clear, investors in marijuana-related businesses face a 
number of uncertainties that typical investors do not.110 Marijuana is 
illegal, so investors face the risk of an enforcement crackdown terminating 
the entire industry.111 Furthermore, investors bear additional risks as to the 
availability and accuracy of information, as many of the marijuana-related 
businesses are un-auditable due to the lack of financial services available 
to them.112  
Yet these risks relate to the unlawful nature of the marijuana-
related business itself—not to the potentially wrongful nature of an 
investment in such a business. If the purchase of securities in an enterprise 
that is criminal is itself wrongful, then the investor must be prepared to 
overcome the affirmative defenses of unclean hands and in pari delicto in 
any securities fraud action resulting therefrom. These similar but distinct 
defenses essentially bar wrongdoers from seeking a remedy from a court 
based on the wrongful conduct. However, understanding the distinction in 
the two doctrines—and how courts frequently confuse the two—is helpful 
in understanding the additional legal uncertainty that defrauded marijuana 
investors face.  
Both unclean hands and in pari delicto have their roots in the 
equitable maxim, “[h]e that hath committed (an) inequity shall not have 
equity.”113 The doctrine of unclean hands is commonly described by the 
 
107Marijuana Banking Update, FINCEN, 
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/273281%20EA%204th%20Q%20MJ%20Stats_Pub
lic_Web.pdf (last visited June 29, 2018). 
108 Hill, supra note 100, at 600–03. 
109 See Investor Alert, supra note 13; Marijuana Stock Scams, supra note 14. 
110 Investor Alert, supra note 13; Marijuana Stock Scams, supra note 14. 
111 Investor Alert, supra note 13. 
112 Id. 
113 Gene G. Harter & Lawrence B. Ordower, Rule 10b-5: The In Pari Delicto and Unclean 
Hands Defenses, 58 CAL. L. REV. 1149, 1162 (1970). 
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maxim, “[h]e who comes into equity must come in with clean hands.”114 
The doctrine of in pari delicto can be thought of as derivative of the 
unclean hands maxim and a separate common law rule.115  
Essentially, both doctrines permit courts to refuse to become 
involved in a dispute between two wrongdoers.116 The rationale is the 
preservation of the legitimacy of the courts: courts should advance 
legitimate public policy aims, and where granting relief to one party would 
undermine a policy goal, the courts should abstain.117 Thus, application of 
either unclean hands or in pari delicto requires that a court examine the 
underlying policy goals behind the claims asserted and the wrongful 
conduct forming the basis of the defense or defenses. 
The doctrines differ in a couple of notable respects, however. First 
and foremost is the consideration of the relative fault of the plaintiff 
compared to the defendant asserting the defense. In pari delicto translates 
to “in equal guilt.”118 Technically, it is therefore applicable only where the 
plaintiff’s fault or wrongful conduct is equally or more objectionable than 
the defendant’s.119 If the plaintiff has committed some wrong, but that 
wrong is not as wrongful as the defendant’s conduct, then strict traditional 
application of in pari delicto will not defeat the claim.120 Unclean hands, 
on the other hand, does not require that the court compare the relative fault 
of plaintiff and defendant.121 The inquiry is whether the plaintiff has 
engaged in some wrongful conduct with regards to the claim before the 
court.122 
Second, despite the merger of law and equity, courts have 
traditionally confined unclean hands to actions seeking equitable relief, 
whereas in pari delicto is applied to both equitable actions and actions for 
legal damages.123 T. Leigh Anenson has found that courts in Wyoming, 
District of Columbia, Georgia, Iowa, Missouri, Pennsylvania, Minnesota, 
North Dakota, New Jersey, Texas, Illinois, Ohio, Arizona, Colorado, and 
 
114 Id. at 1163. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 1163–64; see also Brian A. Blum, Equity’s Leaded Feet in a Contest of 
Scoundrels: The Assertion of the In Pari Delicto Defense Against a Lawbreaking Plaintiff and 
Innocent Successors, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 781, 786–88 (2016); William J. Lawrence, Application of 
the Clean Hands Doctrine in Damage Actions, 57 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 673, 674–77 (1982). 
117 Harter & Ordower, supra note 113, at 1164; Blum, supra note 116, at 786–88; Lawrence, 
supra note 116, at 675. 
118 Blum, supra note 116, at 783. 
119 Id. at 802-03; Harter & Ordower, supra note 113, at 1163. 
120 Blum, supra note 116, at 802–803. Blum also notes, however, that many courts will 
continue to perform a policy analysis even after determining that the plaintiff’s wrongful conduct is 
not worse than the defendants, suggesting that the “equal guilt” component is not a threshold. Id. This 
is in accord with the modern trend with regards to disregarding the distinctions between in pari delicto 
and unclean hands. See Anenson, supra note 4. 
121 Lawrence, supra note 116, at 676.  
122 Id.; see also Blum, supra note 114, at 799–800. 
123 See Anenson, supra note 4; see also Blum, supra note 114, at 800. 
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Massachusetts have refused to extend unclean hands to actions for legal 
damages.124 
However, courts are not consistent in distinguishing between 
unclean hands and in pari delicto, or confining unclean hands to equitable 
actions. The modern trend is to disregard the difference between law and 
equity, and apply the doctrines regardless of the nature of the relief 
requested.125 Anenson finds more recent decisions from California, 
Oregon, Maryland, Michigan, New York, Connecticut, and Rhode Island 
extending unclean hands to legal actions.126 Anenson also identifies 
decisions from the federal courts of appeal and district courts in the 
Eleventh, Fourth, Ninth, Seventh, Sixth, and Fifth Circuits as extending 
unclean hands to purely legal actions,127 with the Third Circuit refusing to 
do so.128 
The law/equity split has particular relevance in the securities law 
context, as there has been some debate over the decades as to whether 
unclean hands, in pari delicto, or both defenses, may be available in a 
particular securities action. For example, in Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., the 
Fifth Circuit considered a Rule 10b-5 fraud case in which the defendant 
asserted both unclean hands and in pari delicto, arguing that the plaintiff’s 
action was barred because the defrauded plaintiff himself intended to use 
the false information to defraud others.129 The court held that both unclean 
hands and in pari delicto were available defenses, although application of 
the defenses was solely within the discretion of the trial court.130  
The Third Circuit, less than a decade later, refused to consider 
unclean hands in a similar Rule 10b-5 fraud case on the basis that the 
plaintiffs sought only damages.131 However, the court cited favorably to 
Kuehnert for the proposition that in pari delicto could—and under the facts 
of the case, should—bar recovery in a private action under Rule 10b-5.132 
The United States Supreme Court addressed the situation in the 
following decade in two separate cases. The first, Bateman Eichler, Hill 
Richards, Inc. v. Berner, examined whether in pari delicto bars a private 
damages action under Rule 10b-5.133 The Court held that it may: 
 
 
124 Anenson, supra note 4, at 69. 
125 Id.  
126 Id. at 73–74. 
127 Id. at 89–90. 
128 Id. at 73. 
129 Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 702 (5th Cir. 1969). 
130 Id. at 704. 
131 Tarasi v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 555 F.2d 1152, 1156 n. 9 (3d Cir. 1977). 
132 Id. at 1163–64. 
133 Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 301 (1985). 
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Accordingly, a private action for damages in these 
circumstances may be barred on the grounds of the plaintiff's 
own culpability only where (1) as a direct result of his own 
actions, the plaintiff bears at least substantially equal 
responsibility for the violations he seeks to redress, and (2) 
preclusion of suit would not significantly interfere with the 
effective enforcement of the securities laws and protection of 
the investing public.134 
 
In Pinter v. Dahl, the Court extended the Bateman Eichler rule to 
a private action for rescission under Section 12 of the 1933 Act,135 but also 
held that in pari delicto would only be appropriate where the plaintiff acted 
more as a promoter of the business rather than a mere investor.136 Both 
cases adopted a traditional analysis of in pari delicto, emphasizing the 
requirement that the plaintiff’s fault must be at least equal to the 
defendant’s for the doctrine to apply.137  
However, neither case clarifies whether Bateman Eichler’s in pari 
delicto rule should extend to situations in which unclean hands may be an 
available defense. The rule, as articulated, would suggest that it does. “The 
plaintiff’s own culpability”138 is the trigger for both unclean hands and in 
pari delicto. But Pinter seemed to caution against equating unclean hands 
with in pari delicto:  
 
Contemporary courts have expanded the defense’s application 
to situations more closely analogous to those encompassed by 
the “unclean hands” doctrine, where the plaintiff has 
participated “in some of the same sort of wrongdoing” as the 
defendant. In Perma Life, however, the Court concluded that 
this broadened construction is not appropriate in litigation 
arising under federal regulatory statutes.139 
 
Thus, while there is a clear rule for applying in pari delicto in 
federal securities fraud cases, the applicability and scope of the unclean 
hands defense is an open question. However, plaintiffs in securities fraud 
cases may seek either equitable or legal relief.140 Indeed, for a defrauded 
 
134 Id. at 310–11.  
135 Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 633 (1988). 
136 Id. at 639. 
137 Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S. at 312–14; Pinter, 486 U.S. at 635–37. 
138 Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S. at 310. 
139 Pinter, 486 U.S. at 632; see Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 
U.S. 134, 138 (1968).  
140 E.g., Pinter, 486 U.S. at 627 (Plaintiffs sought the equitable remedy of rescission, as 
opposed to damages); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1972) (Plaintiffs sought the legal 
remedy of damages and the equitable remedy of injunction); see Nicholas R. Weiskopf, Remedies 
Under Rule 10b-5, 45 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 733, 751–52 (1971) (“[A]mple case authority exists for the 
proposition that the defrauded seller or purchaser may, at his option, seek rescission in lieu of such 
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investor, an action for the equitable remedy of rescission or a legal claim 
for damages should result in the same outcome if the securities are 
virtually worthless, such as in a pump-and-dump scheme.141 
  Therefore, under the Bateman Eichler rule, the focus 
should not be on the technical distinction between unclean hands and in 
pari delicto, but instead should be on the policy implications of permitting 
either defense. In Bateman Eichler, the Supreme Court recognized the 
policy concerns in applying in pari delicto to bar the securities fraud 
lawsuit: 
 
We also believe that denying the in pari delicto defense in such 
circumstances will best promote the primary objective of the 
federal securities laws -- protection of the investing public and 
the national economy through the promotion of “a high standard 
of business ethics . . . in every facet of the securities industry.” 
Although a number of lower courts have reasoned that a broad 
rule of caveat tippee would better serve this goal, we believe 
the contrary position adopted by other courts represents the 
better view.  
To begin with, barring private actions in cases such as this 
would inexorably result in a number of alleged fraudulent 
practices going undetected by the authorities and unremedied. 
The SEC has advised us that it “does not have the resources to 
police the industry sufficiently to ensure that false tipping does 
not occur or is consistently discovered,” and that “[without] the 
tippees' assistance, the Commission could not effectively 
prosecute false tipping -- a difficult practice to detect.” … The 
in pari delicto defense, by denying any incentive to a defrauded 
tippee to bring suit against his defrauding tipper, would 
significantly undermine this important goal.  
Moreover, we believe that deterrence of insider trading 
most frequently will be maximized by bringing enforcement 
pressures to bear on the sources of such information -- corporate 
insiders and broker-dealers.142 
 
 
damages.”); Samuel W. Buell, What is Securities Fraud?¸ 61 DUKE L.J. 511, 517 (2011) (describing 
securities fraud’s origins as connecting “to both law and equity jurisdiction”). 
141 Weiskopf, supra note 140, at 752 (“Where securities purchased in a tainted transaction 
are worthless at the time of sale, the recovery of damages and the award of rescission will produce 
identical results- recovery of the full purchase price by the defrauded purchaser.”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
142 Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S. at 315–16 (internal citations omitted). 
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Thus, Bateman Eichler establishes that the public policy behind 
securities fraud actions favors permitting fraud suits to move forward 
despite in pari delicto concerns. 
But in the context of the marijuana industry, the competing policy 
of federal controlled substances enforcement complicates the analysis. As 
discussed in depth above, despite the enforcement restrictions imposed by 
Rohrabacher-Farr, use, distribution, possession, or cultivation of 
marijuana is illegal under federal law.143 A court could recognize the 
competing federal policies at issue and defer to the basic maxim 
underlying either unclean hands or in pari delicto to dismiss the action: a 
court should not give comfort to a person engaged in unlawful conduct. 
However, it would not be unreasonable for a court to conclude that 
Rohrabacher-Farr is an expression of federal policy itself, and that to the 
extent the criminal conduct of the business enterprise is within the scope 
of Rohrabacher-Farr (for example, the business operates solely within the 
medical marijuana industry within the states or territories covered by 
Rohrabacher-Farr and in complete compliance with state law), the 
securities law policy priorities should control.144 Thus, courts should 
clarify the extent to which unclean hands and in pari delicto apply as a 
matter of policy in such circumstances.  
 
V. TOWARDS A CLEARER RULE FOR UNCLEAN HANDS AND IN 
PARI DELICTO IN SECURITIES LAW 
 
In sum, investors in a marijuana-related business not only bear 
enhanced risks associated with accuracy and availability of information, 
but also enhanced legal risks that any claim for fraud deriving therefrom 
will not be allowed. Under current jurisprudence, perhaps the only clear 
outcome is that in pari delicto will bar a plaintiff who is an insider or 
promoter of the business from recovering.145 Beyond that single factual 
determination, other factors that may play into the analysis are (i) whether 
the plaintiff pursues an equitable or legal remedy, (ii) whether the 
distinction between law and equity matters to the court, (iii) whether the 
business engages in the medical marijuana industry only or also in the 
 
143 See Part III. 
144 See Tarr v. USF Reddaway, Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 216637, at *14–16 (D. Or. 
Nov. 7, 2017). Tarr involved a wrongful death action in which the Oregon district court sat in diversity 
jurisdiction. Id. at 1. The plaintiff sought, inter alia, economic damages relating to the decedent’s 
medical marijuana business operating legally under Washington law. Id. at 15. The defendant sought 
to bar the recovery on the basis that such a business is illegal under federal law. Id. The court allowed 
the plaintiff to proceed with the claim, stating, “[m]arijuana's legal status is unique. It is neither fully 
legal nor illegal. Because Tarr's family cannabis business is allegedly legal under Washington law, I 
conclude that in a diversity action, Plaintiff may recover economic damages based on projected profits 
from that business.” Id. 
145 Pinter, 486 U.S. at 639. 
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recreational segment, (iv) whether the business has fully complied with all 
state law requirements, and (v) the plaintiff investor’s knowledge and 
belief as to all of the foregoing. Furthermore, because, the application of 
either unclean hands or in pari delicto is at the discretion of the court, there 
is a greater risk of conflicting decisions from district to district, or even 
judge to judge within a district. 
Accordingly, the author believes that the courts should clarify and 
adopt a clearer rule for the application of unclean hands and in pari delicto 
in the securities law context, where the business is alleged to have engaged 
in conduct that is prohibited by law. The author would propose the 
following two-step rule that is, substantially, in line with current unclean 
hands and in pari delicto jurisprudence, but simpler in its application. 
First, the court should ascertain whether the plaintiff was an 
insider, promoter, or active participant in the fraud; for instance, did the 
plaintiff have a duty to protect investors from the fraud perpetrated? If so, 
the plaintiff investor’s claim should be barred. Such a rule is consistent 
with both Bateman Eichler and Pinter, and both federal securities and 
criminal law enforcement policies would be promoted by denying the 
investor a remedy. 
Second, if the plaintiff investor was not under a duty to protect 
others from fraud—that is, the plaintiff was merely an investor in a 
business engaging in illegal activities—the court should determine 
whether the plaintiff investor at the time of the fraud was aware that the 
business was planning to engage in activities clearly prohibited by federal 
policy. Was the plaintiff investor willing to ignore the illegal nature of the 
business in the quest for profit? If so, the claim should be barred. 
This second prong maintains the focus on the plaintiff’s conduct. 
If the plaintiff willingly accepts the risk of participating in a clearly illegal 
business operation, then the plaintiff’s objections to resulting investment 
losses are less concerning from a policy perspective. However, a truly 
innocent investor’s claims should not be barred. 
The second prong does require the court also to determine whether 
there is a clear federal policy on the matter. With regards to marijuana, a 
court should conclude that federal policy as to recreational marijuana is 
clear—there has been no legislative restriction on criminal enforcement of 
recreational marijuana businesses, and therefore, an investor who 
knowingly invests in a recreational marijuana business should be willing 
to bear the risk associated with participating in an illegal scheme. With 
regards to medical marijuana, Congress has established its preferred policy 
via Rohrabacher-Farr: the federal government’s intervention in the 
medical marijuana industry should be limited. Therefore, innocent 
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investors in the medical marijuana industry should be allowed to proceed 
with their security fraud claims. 
While the foregoing test does not necessarily establish a true 
bright-line for courts to apply, it does at least eliminate the need to 
distinguish between unclean hands and in pari delicto. Furthermore, it 
provides direction on how courts should weigh investor culpability in light 
of competing policy provisions, which is where the true analysis under 
both unclean hands and in pari delicto lies. It also encourages promoters 
or insiders to share information about the nature of the business with 
investors by including more explicit disclaimers to any investment 
solicitation materials. An investor ignoring such a warning does so at his 
or her own peril. Lastly, even though the rule as articulated above is 
examined in light of federal marijuana policy, it could be easily adapted to 
any number of situations in which federal law enforcement policy may 
conflict with federal securities law—conflicts that can be remedied by 
clear action on the part of lawmakers.  
In sum, the rule protects truly innocent investors whose culpability 
stems from inconsistent enforcement and lawmaking by policymakers. It 
does not protect investors who blatantly ignore consistent federal policy, 
nor does it protect persons who are truly culpable in the fraud itself.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Marijuana is criminally illegal. That a majority of states now 
permit marijuana sales in some form does not change that fact. 
Furthermore, federal limitations on prosecution in those states do not 
extend to private actions between industry participants. Accordingly, 
investors in marijuana-related businesses—criminal enterprises under 
federal law—bear the risk that any action for securities fraud may be 
barred by the doctrines of unclean hands and in pari delicto. 
However, federal lawmakers bear some blame in creating such a 
situation, by their failure to legislatively articulate a clear and consistent 
policy with regards to marijuana. Marijuana is criminally prohibited, but 
federal law enforcement cannot use any funds to interfere with state 
medical marijuana programs. Thus, it is no surprise that investors would 
assume that securities fraud claims would not be barred. 
Courts, therefore, should clarify existing case law with regards to 
unclean hands and in pari delicto in the securities fraud context. While 
previous United States Supreme Court cases have permitted claims to 
proceed where federal securities law policy was supported, those cases did 
not have to weigh competing federal law enforcement priorities against 
securities law priorities. In the marijuana-related business context—or in 
any context where the business is engaged in activity prohibited by federal 
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law—courts must consider the totality of federal policy in determining 
whether to permit the action to proceed.  
The author proposes a two-step analysis. First, was the plaintiff 
investor an insider, promoter, or participant in the fraud, such that the 
plaintiff was under a duty to protect other investors from the fraud? If so, 
the claim should be dismissed, consistent with current law. Second, was 
the plaintiff investor at the time of the fraud aware that the business was 
to engage in activities clearly prohibited by federal policy? If so, the action 
should be barred. If not, the action should proceed. 
In the marijuana context, Congress has established a clear federal 
policy as to recreational marijuana: it is criminally illegal to manufacture, 
distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or 
dispense, marijuana, and Congress has not otherwise restricted 
enforcement of this statute. Accordingly, investors in marijuana-related 
businesses engaged in the recreational marijuana industry should be 
prohibited by the unclean hands or in pari delicto defenses.  
However, Congressional policy is not clear as to medical 
marijuana, as the Rohrabacher-Farr appropriations amendment prohibits 
prosecution or other Justice Department action against participants in 
state-authorized medical marijuana programs. Because of this 
Congressional action, the stated federal policy is non-intervention in the 
medical marijuana industry. Consistent with such policy, investors in 
marijuana-related businesses subject to Rohrabacher-Farr protections 
should be permitted to pursue federal securities fraud claims. 
 
